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Theoretical and methodological considerations
Strategy is a key concept of this new project on union strategies at the European 
University. I understand the concept of strategy in the same broad sense as Werner 
Abelshauser uses it in his outline of the project, i. e. the concept includes both 
deliberate, intended, 'rationally' calculated and emergent strategies.
Strategy is closely related to the concept of intention. My assumption is that 
intentions can be empirically observed and discerned. However, intended actions 
should not be mistaken for intended outcomes, for in the course of social conflict 
many of the intentions of social actors cross-cut each other and come together in 
complex and unpredictable patterns. Uncertainty of the intentions of other actors is 
a crucial factor when strategies are formed. Trust is a key concept which reduces this 
uncertainty without necessarily excluding conflict, Authority and legitimacy are other 
concepts which should be considered in this context.
Uncertainty means that it is important to distinguish between the 
perceptions of actors and the ex post facto reconstructions of historians. Both 
perspectives are necessary for consistent analysis but they have to be kept 
analytically apart.
In this perspective of historical complexity, strategies that are ex post facto 
successful can be given their specific logics analytically through reconstruction - 
which is not to say that there were no other alternatives or that what happened hod 
to happen. Neither does my perspective mean that those who suggested or put to 
the test successful strategies necessarily realised the full potential of such strategies. 
Quite often, ex post facto successful strategies are proposed as part of a process of 
perpetual problem resolution - as short-term responses and reactions to emerging 
social problems, ignoring their long-term impact.
The way in which strategies, as responses to emerging problems in the 
organisation of the labour market or the whole society, were linked by the collective 
decisions and intentional actions of employers, unions, and politicians seems to 




























































































interests of key actors was greater in Sweden than in Germany. This capacity must be 
referred to the way in which interests are produced and identities constructed in the 
discursive struggles over the formulation of problems in the organisation of society 
and, in our specific case, the labour market.
Once interest production brings the interests of different actors and 
formations together in a single formula for change, it is likely that a successful 
strategy will emerge. By means of hindsight, the logic and rationality of such 
strategies are explored and explained in social discourse, and institutions with their 
own emerging inertia are established to implement them. Institutional inertia means 
that there is a tendency to self-fulfilment of the successful strategy.
The Swedish case not only reveals a successful bringing-together of 
separate interests and their institutionalisation, but it also demonstrates that new 
problems on the political agenda may require solutions which the strategy and its 
institutions fail to provide. This seems to be what happened in the 1980s. At such 
historical turning points, interest production, identity construction and the 
development of interpretive frameworks must be tackled from new perspectives. At 
the same time, the question of conflict or compromise becomes an open question.
In the case of labour-market organization in Sweden and Germany I have 
discerned such turning points in the 1890s, 1930s and 1970s/1980s. (Here I must 
emphasise that, although my final goal is to undertake a systematic comparison 
between Sweden and Germany, for the time being I have only an empirical 
foundation for an analysis of the Swedish case with special reference to Germany).
Interests and interest production are important in my perspective. As 
opposed to the theoretical derivation of interests, I would like to suggest that interests 
are produced as a result of discursive struggle. The theoretical derivation of interests 
can be illustrated by reference to E P Thompson's linkage of experience and interests. 
Experience' is a key concept in Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class. 
On the. basis of experience English workers discovered their class identity. Interests 




























































































perceptions. Thompson sees interests as derivatives of productive relationships. The 
historian's question is one of timing and context: when and under what 
circumstances were these interests and the working-class identity (consciousness) 
they produced discovered?
This approach, however, leads to a serious theoretical impasse, well 
illustrated by notions such as 'false consciousness' and 'objective' or 'true' interests. 
The assumption has been an essentialist concept of class and the purpose of the 
analysis has been to demonstrate concordance with, or explain deviation from, 
positions which some socioeconomically derived logic is presumed to ascribe.1 
Historians have looked at the 'base' rather than at changes in the political struggle 
itself to explain changes in political allegiances. One possibility for avoiding this 
impasse would be to look upon interests and class identities the other way round: not 
as something which pre-exist their expressions but as something produced and given 
existence through their very expressions.
Such a shift in perspective calls for an analysis of the struggle for discursive 
power. An analysis of this kind must focus on how categories of class were 
formulated through representation in discursive contests where the goal was the right 
to define and identify problems, and their resolution, in the organisation of society. In 
such contests patterns of affirmations, negations, and repressions emerge in 
processes by which one definition comes out as more or less dominant. An analysis of 
discursive contests would look for both explicitly stated and implicitly structured 
political relationships. According to Joan Scott, the result would not be a unitary 
concept of class, not history as teleology, but a concept of class as a field that 
always contains multiple and contested meanings.2
1. Cf Peter Schbttler, 'Historians and Discourse Analysis' in History Workshop Journal 
No 27 Spring 1989 p 37. See also Bo Strdth, 'Introduction: Production of Meaning, 
Construction of Class Identities, and Social Change' in Bo Strdth (ed), Language 
and the Construction of Class Identities. The Struggle for Discursive Power in 
Social Organisation. Scandinavia and Germany after 1800. Gothenburg 
University 1990.





























































































The outcomes of conceptual struggles are always uncertain. The outcome 
of battles among social forces about the interpretation of a concept is a highly 
contingent affair the outcome of which is emergent not causative. The ability to 
launch new concepts that have the capacity to convince, and the ability to 
'conquer' key concepts and positions of priority or of monopoly in the interpretation 
of them, is of critical importance in the historical process. However, concepts do not 
in themselves cause change, rather they establish a particular horizon for potential 
action. They make change possible, on the one hand, and they set limits for possible 
change, on the other. In this sense, concepts organised as discourses or ideologies 
are similar to what Weber called Weltbilder (worldviews) which function as 
Weichensteller (pointsmen), leading historical developments into new trajectories.
The historian who has most systematically focussed on conceptual analysis 
in his work is Reinhart Koselieck. As his point of departure he takes what he considers 
to characterise 'modernity', namely, a constant state of political crisis. Thus the term 
'modernisation' takes on a new meaning, one that is different from the usual 
connotation of a rationally calculated, general evolutionary process of 
development. He has developed conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) both as a 
theory of modernity and as a method for historical analysis.3
Koselleck's methodological approach calls for a thorough investigation of 
the discursive aspect of major transitions. Questions need to be asked about what 
new concepts were introduced by whom, (and which old concepts were given new 
meanings), and to what purpose. The contours of a new conceptual topography 
constituting 'modernity' and its anticipation of the future can be discerned, and the 
way in which socioeconomic experience was mediated through this horizon can be 
analysed. This is the core of Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte.
Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte is more than a history of ideas. Linguistic 
transformations are mapped out empirically in the context of sociopolitical
3. Reinhart Koselieck, Critique and Crisis. Cambridge UP 1989; ibid. Futures Past. On 




























































































struggles.4 5Thus the analysis of language is grounded in the redlities of non-linguistic 
events. Koselleck explicitly sees Begriffsgeschichte as a methodologically 
independent did to sociol history, not os o kind of disembodied intellectuol history.
Historical Preconditions
The primary objective of Swedish trade unions when they developed their 
organisations in the 1880s and 1890s wos to increose workers' power in the lobour 
morket, while control of work and the work process was of minor importance. 
Collective agreements became the instrument of this approach in the 1890s. The 
effect was the emergence of strong trade unions which restricted price competition 
and other soles conditions on the lobour morket.6
An extremely important aspect of the historical context within which this 
development took ploce wos emigration to North America. Between 1850 and 1920, 
1 million Swedes emigrated, out of o total population of 5.2 million in 1900. 
Corresponding levels were only reached in Irelond ond Norwoy.
The perception of a tight labour market during this crucial phase of 
industrialisation in Sweden set important preconditions for union strategies. The 
perception was a major problem in social and political discourse at the turn of the 
century. The problem as seen by the bourgeoisie was not so much the threat of a 
rising mob as the threat of a long-term labour shortage.
4. The fact that the direction of the social change cannot be theoretically 
predicted and does not conform to law should not lead us to think (or fear) that 
Koselleck brings us back to Ranke's historicism, where the role of social and 
economic processes is neglected at the expense of 'the understandable actions 
of great individuals'. Koselleck's approach emphasises the role of human agency 
but rejects a method which, in a biased way, underlines the individual. His 
approach opens up the path towards social sciences and the material reality’.
5. Klas Amark, Facklig makt och fackligt medlemskap. Arkiv, Lund 1986 has
described this process as the establishment of open cartels on the labour side 
(as well as on the capital side). Open cartels were the key element of both 




























































































This perceived labour market situation gave specific strength to the unions 
which as a result gave priority to the improving conditions in the labour market. The 
implicit idea was that if the unions succeeded in this, their control over work and the 
work process would increase indirectly, without it being necessary to target such 
control as a primary goal in itself. Clause 23 in the charter of the Swedish Employers' 
Association (SAF) gave employers the exclusive right to ’direct and distribute work' 
within enterprises. Although the clause was a thorn in the side of the union leaders 
until it was repealed through government legislation in 1976, it was never an energy­
absorbing primary object of attack. The clause could be circumvented in different 
ways.
This pattern of development is an important deviation from what happened 
in Germany where attempts to develop institutions for conflict regulation and to 
'modernise' industrial relations occurred concomitantly with the launching by the 
employers' organisations of an ideological struggle against the workers. In Sweden 
the employers' organisations were not fighting organisations to anything like the 
same extent. The significance of the organisation of capitalist interests was different 
in Germany. There was no organisation in Sweden which could compare with the 
associations of the Schwerindustrielle in the Ruhr area. The Centralverband 
Deutscher Industriellen where the Herren aus dem Westen held a powerful position 
had no analogue in Sweden. Another striking difference was the regional and 
sectoral division of organised employers' cooperation in Germany which brought a 
pattern where there were both 'hawk' and 'dove' perspectives on the question of 
how to treat the emerging organisation of labour. There was an obvious trend 
towards the modernisation of conflict as in Sweden, but this was offset by an 
opposing trend whereby employers aimed to crush the unions. Taken together this 
contradictory pattern resulted in a much more polarised order than in Sweden.
In Sweden the organisation of employers was much more homogeneous. In 
1902 a strong, centralised and hierarchical peak organisation (SAF) was established 




























































































organisation (LO) in 1898. By the turn of the century the organisation of the Swedish 
labour market acquired its distinctive features of a strongly centralised and 
hierarchical order. In Germany the pattern was much more complex and diverse.
The organization of capital in Sweden was more an instrument of 
professional problem resolution than an instrument for ideological struggle. Swedish 
employers realised that the trade unions had grown very strong during the 1890s and 
1900s. and they drew conclusions from this insight which also paid regdrd to the 
perceived threat of a long-term labour shortage. These conclusions were only 
temporarily set aside following the heavy defeat of the unions in the general strike of 
1909. United action by the workers in a single movement - in which, as early as in the 
1890s, more than one-fourth of the total workforce was unionised - left no scope, for 
instance, for yellow unions. The employers realised this early as well. In Germany not 
only the employers but also the union movement was much more split and divided. 
Regionally, the liberal and catholic unions gained considerable strength and in some 
cases even outflanked the socialist unions.
When workers in Sweden began to unionise and to demand the right to 
conclude collective agreements, employers were faced with a choice of strategies. 
Between 1895 and 1910 a regulative order emerged in the labour market, and the 
institutions of a collective-agreement regime were formed. The employers and their 
peak organization, SAP, gave priority to calculability and predictability in their 
relations with the trade unions. The unions' peak organization. LO. established in 1898, 
accepted the prerogative of the employers to decide over the work process and 
concentrated on wages.
The emergence of a new collective-bargaining order was not the inevitable 
consequence of structural preconditions. Rather, the emerging order was gradually 
tried and tested in a process whereby different local cultures, with varying power 
relationships and strategy options and preferences, were gradually transformed into 
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This emerging order did not mean that the labour market became 
especially peaceful or consensual but only that conflict was regulated and 
institutionalised. Sweden was the most strike-prone country in Western Europe in the 
early 20th century. The period round about the turn of the century was one of rapid 
union growth: between 1902 and 1907, for instance, union membership increased by 
260 per cent.6 The employers realised the advantages of controlled conflict and of 
collective agreements as opposed to uncontrolled conflict and no agreements. It 
was a question of establishing a balance of power with the aim of preventing 
conflict from exceeding an acceptable level.
The Swedish sociologist Góran Therborn explains the specific form of the 
institutionalisation of labour market relations in Sweden in terms of the management 
styles of professional managers and the strength of the workers' organisation.7 Once 
the employers had recognised the strength of the unions and contributed to the 
development of a policy for conflict regulation, they became very legalistic. They 
developed the policy through negotiations, formalised agreements and firm 
adherence to the letter of the agreements vis-à-vis both the unions and their own 
members. The early policies of SAF were formulated by law school graduates. 
Between 1907 and 1976 SAF never had a managing director with experience of 
industry. They were all professionals in law. The long-term consequence of this 
approach was that the state could take up a fairly neutral stance early on. There 
was 'a complete lack of proneness to ideological proclamations' in the approach of 
the employers.8 This, in turn, had consequences for the Social Democrats' view of the 
state. They never got caught in the squeeze between class and state as the Social 
Democrats did in Germany,
Rapid union growth during the 1890s and the development of stable 
organisations and efficient union leadership brought about a division of labour
6. Ibid
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between the Social Democratic Party and the unions. The process of gradual 
development of institutions for conflict regulation did not result in a chasm between 
class and state, as in Germany. Major lockouts in the engineering industry in 1903 and 
1905 resulted not only in the December Compromise in 1906, implying mutual 
recognition and agreement on collective bargaining, but also the establishment of a 
government conciliation board which gained legitimacy and decreased direct 
Social Democratic involvement in the regulation of conflict in the labour market.
At the turn of the century in both Sweden and Germany, the phase of what 
I would like to call 'organised cdpitdlism' involved the expansion of heavy industry; 
the homogenisdtion of the working-class; class consciousness and a polarised 
perception of society; the unionisation of the workers; and the organisation of 
capital, attributable to the growing strength of the unions. In both Sweden and 
Germany, the transition to organised capital brought strong organisations of both 
labour and capital.
However, the case of Sweden demonstrates that organised capital did not 
necessarily lead to polarisotion os it did in Germany. In Sweden the polarised 
perception of society which took root in the wake of the emergence of organised 
capitalism was supplemented and depolarised by a perception of the working class 
as part of the smdfolket. 'the petty people1, which, in turn, was the core of the whole 
folket. While the working class was certainly homogenised, bridging networks to other 
social groups were simultaneously developed meaning that there was little space for 
a real class struggle metaphor. The mutual recognition in the December 
Compromise in 1906, after the lockouts in the engineering industry in 1903 and 1905, 
gave little scope for any kind of Herr-im-Hause metaphor as in Germany. The 
development of union strategies and of industrial relations in the direction of 
'empiricol opportunism' and the rationalisation’ of conflict in the labour market were 
highly compatible with the parliamentary strategy of the Social Democrats, who 
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The Converging Interests in Rationalisation
At the turn of the century, reductions in working hours strengthened the 
employers' interest in work efficiency. At first this interest provoked workers' 
opposition. In 1911 the managing director of SAF accused the workers of resisting 
rationalisation. The chairman of LO refuted the accusation. The central problem was 
that Swedish industry was working with out-of-date methods. The workers did not 
oppose piece work wages on principle, for instance, although they were very critical 
of rationalisation in the form that Taylor suggested.9
A twenty-year period followed when both the employers and the unions in 
the engineering industry argued that they favoured rational production and 
rationalisation, although - and this is important - there was conflict and evasiveness 
over the precise content of the concept.
Although its content was disputed, grounds for this shared interest in 
rationalisation emerged during the public debate between 1890 and 1910 on how to 
achieve industrial expansion and discourage workers from emigrating to North 
America.10 Another factor working in the same direction was the reduction in 
working hours between 1891 and 1920 from 62 to 48 per week in the engineering 
industry, (i.e. a reduction of 22.5 per cent). The workers demanded wage 
compensation for the reduction in their incomes. The response of the Engineering 
Employers' Association was to require increased efficiency of labour. The reduction in 
working hours was to be exploited to achieve maximal work intensity, and the 
Association elaborated a programme for efficient working hours'.11
In the 1910s, the emergence of an agreement on how to deal with the 
reduction in working hours was, in turn, closely related to the fact that the problem of
9. Anders Johansson, Tillvdxt och klassamarbete. Tiden, Stockholm 1989 esp chs 
2,3,6.
10. Ibid p 35.
u. Alf Johansson, Den effektiva arbetstiden. Verkstaderna och arbetsintensitetens 




























































































the Swedish labour market had to do with a perceived shortage of labour. This point 
of departure took on a completely new significance a year after the legislation of 
1919 on the eight-hour working-day. The postwar depression beginning in the 
summer of 1920 brought unemployment levels never seen before, e.g. 25-30 per cent 
in the engineering industry.
The decision, in 1919, to introduce the eight-hour day, and the economic 
depression of the early 1920s led workers to hold a broader and deeper view of 
rationalisation. In reaction to employers' demands for reduced wages when working 
hours were decreased - demands which were repeated during the depression of the 
early 1920s when nothing could prevent the employers from carrying through normal 
wage cuts - the metalworkers' union argued that reductions could be compensated 
for by increased work intensity and by the more rational use of equipment. I.e., when 
exposed to the depression, the metalworkers used what had earlier been the 
employers' argument. When, during the economic crisis, the employers started to cut 
wages, the message of the unions was that rationalisation measures should first be 
tried out in order to decrease production costs, In 1921 LO suggested the 
establishment of a tripartite board for the promotion of structural rationalisation in 
Swedish industry.12
The issue of the eight-hour day had a completely different outcome in 
Germany, where it brought conflict between the unions and the employers a few 
years after it was implemented. Organized capital and organized labour were both 
aware that there was a need for productivity improvements and hence for 
rationalisation; but they completely failed to agree on a strategy capable of 
realizing it. For employers in the heavy industry of the Ruhr district rationalisation' 
became a key concept involved in recapturing concessions made to the unions in 
1918.13 Replacement of the equipment worn out during the war brought
12. Anders Johansson op cit p 54.
13. Gerald D Feldman and Irmgard Steinisch, 'Die Weimarer Republik zwischen 
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsstaat. Die Entscheidung gegen den Achtstundentag' in 




























































































accelerated rationalisation and enormous productivity gains. The heyday of this 
rationalisation was the period between 1925 and 1929. in the mechanical 
engineering industry, productivity increased by 45 per cent between 1924 and 1927 
and in the iron industry by 41 per cent, such increases being a reflection of 
enhanced rationalisation. Another effect was increased job insecurity. The 
instruments of rationalisation were concentration and cartelisation on the one hand, 
and intensified exploitation of new materials, energy, machinery, and labour on the 
other, in industries like the iron and steei industry, where machines already 
determined the pace of work, increased work intensity was less feasible than an 
extension of the working hours. Thus, for the metalworkers’ union, 'rationalisation' at 
the beginning of the 1920s meant longer working hours, and by the end of the 
decade and in the early 1930s, unemployment.
In Sweden there was a change in the unions' interpretative framework in 
that an emphasis on rationalisation as impoverishment and exploitation gave way to 
an interest in the question of the distribution of increased production. There was also 
a change from a concentration on the impact of rationalisation on the organisation 
of work to a concentration on its economic yield - which in turn could provide the 
basis for an improved standard of living, reforms, and wage improvements.
In the metal workers' unions the view rapidly gained ground that instead of 
being a zero-sum game where the gain of one party necessarily meant a loss for the 
other, increased production efficiency would mean a bigger pie to share between 
capital and labour. The unions moved from a Marxist exploitation-and- 
impoverishment perspective towards a reformist view of production increases. The 
LO congress of 1926 was important in this development.14
However, the congress not only revealed a new orientation but also 
demonstrated that the question was still highly controversial among the rank and file. 
At a tripartite industrial peace conference in the autumn of 1928, initiated by the 
Swedish government in the prevailing mood of Mondism in those days, the
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metalworkers' representative argued that conflict was inevitable when rationalisation 
brought redundancy and/or downward pressure on piecework rates. The 
metalworkers were not opposed to rationalisation nerse. only to these two effects.15
At the beginning of the conference a new concept was suggested as a 
basis for compromise: 'rational rationalisation'. While the objections of the workers 
were recognised, there was agreement that in the long run rationalisation produced 
new jobs. It was agreed that it was important to spread information about what 
rationalisation really was and about the advantages it brought. On the basis of this 
agreement rationalisation was given a new definition, whereby its content could 
vary and as a result of which there was no need for the tautological rational 
rationalisation'. In the report of a tripartite Industrial Peace Delegation in 1929 it was 
stated that rationalisation was in the interests of employers and workers alike. The 
scientific organisation of work and the simplification of production methods were 
said to be especially important.16
The means of achieving these aims were work planning and time and 
motion study'. Rationalisation brought increased production at lower costs. While 
there might be some short-term redundancy, rationalisation released capital for 
expansion projects and the establishment of new enterprises which, in turn, created 
new employment. Rationalisation was necessary in order to be able to compete in 
international markets, and it 'increased the possibilities of maintaining or raising 
wages'. Rationalisation measures were to be taken in the light of 'social 
considerations' in order to mitigate workers' difficulties during the period of transition 
from one job to another.
Anders Johansson has demonstrated how the emergence of consensual 
views on the concept of rationalisation in the late 1920s meant that work-study 
engineers advanced at the front lines, as the combat soldiers of the emerging 
Swedish model. As a result of their work, increased profits could be generated which
is. Ibid pp 63-76. 




























































































the representatives of capita! and labour could then distribute at the negotiating 
table.
Swedish industry in the 1920s was still very strike-prone in comparison with 
other nations, Thus, in tandem with the institutionalisation of collective bargaining 
and the development of interest in rationalisation, there was a heightened concern 
to reduce the level of conflict. In the 1920s tripartite interest in this issue increased 
sharply.
Social Democratic, Liberal and Conservative governments all gave proof of 
their interest in industrial peace. In 1921 the Social Democratic government 
appointed a committee which was, however, shelved after just one year. In 1924 the 
committee was reestablished by a Conservative government. In 1926 a Social 
Democratic government appointed a new tripartite inquiry committee. In 1928 a 
Liberal government introduced a law concerning collective agreements. This law 
established a Labour Court - implying the imposition of industrial peace when there 
was a standing agreement.
The Turning Points of the 1930s
The economic depression in the early 1930s brought rapidly increasing 
unemployment. In the union movement rationalisation became one of the main 
targets of rank and file criticism; for rationalisation brought increased production 
capacity, which made the workers redundant.
In Sweden, during the talks on industrial peace in the late 1920s, the unions 
had already declared that there was a connection between rationalisation and 
unemployment. A sense of responsibility for the victims of rationalisation was a 
prerequisite for union participation in the talks. At the LO congress in 1931 there was 




























































































temporarily to leave the tripartite Industrial Peace Committee. Central cooperation 
came to nothing.'7
Again, the problem of industrial peace was a major issue on the political 
agenda. No government could remain unconcerned about this question. The Social 
Democratic minority government replaced the old relief work policy - something that 
was akin to poor relief - with unemployment insurance (see below).
The unemployment effects of the severe crisis; the criticism of rationalisation; 
the collapse of the labour-market compromise, and the threat that Sweden would 
again become one of the most strike-prone countries in the industrialised world - all 
these formed a chain reaction which provoked the government to intervene after it 
had secured its position in parliament through a 'red-green' agreement with the 
farmers, known as the 'Horse Trade Agreement' (kohandeln). The Social Democratic 
recipe was not original. Its response to the crisis was not based on a theoretically well 
thought-out strategy, but was merely a political response to immediate social and 
economic pressure. The government simply did what it felt politically obliged to do, 
and in order to be able to do anything at all it had to do some genuine horse trading 
with the farmers: unemployment benefits at the level of market wages were 
exchanged for increased prices for agricultural products. Only later did Keynes 
legitimise this strategy. Unemployment, which stood at 15 per cent in 1933 was still at 
a level of 9 per cent in 1939. Thus, in that respect, the effects of the 'horse trade were 
not particularly dramatic. Its effects on the level of legitimacy were much more 
decisive. After all, the figures declined and people started to believe that in the 
future the economic situation would be easier to control.
An important aspect of the government's intervention in 1932-3 was it took 
responsibility for redundancies arising from rationalisation. New preconditions for a 
resumption of the labour-market compromise were met in 1934 when the 
government introduced a system of voluntary unemployment insurance. The unions 
had argued for a compulsory scheme; however, the Minister of Social Welfare,




























































































Gustav Moller decided in favour of voluntary insurance along the lines of proposals 
which the Liberals had been making since the 1920s. Moller's legislation gave 
responsibility for managing the funds to the unions. In his view the government had 
an obligation to support only those workers who took responsibility for themselves by 
joining a union unemployment scheme. The long-term effect of this union- 
administrated voluntary unemployment insurance was a rapidly growing rate of 
unionisation. Bo Rothstein has convincingly argued, on the basis of an international 
comparison, that this effect of the principle of voluntarism was a decisive factor 
contributing to the strength and status of the unions in Swedish society.18
The decision on unemployment insurance became a key element in the 
realisation of institutions aimed at establishing Social Democratic control over the 
labour market. Labour-market policy ceased to harass and interfere with vital union 
interests and became a powerful support of union policies. Social-Democratic 
political power in the 1930s was used to strengthen the unions which, in turn, became 
a powerful support of Social-Democratic politics in an interactive and mutually 
reinforcing order which developed its own institutional dynamics.
In 1935 the government's commission on unemployment submitted its final 
report. The conclusions of this committee of expert economists were founded on 
neoclassical wage theory and recommended a policy of wage-restraint to the 
unions in order to mitigate unemployment. LO criticised the report for making wages 
policy the main determinant of unemployment. LO argued that rationalisation was 
the main cause and raised the question of government control of rationalisation.
In January, 1936 Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson and the Minister of Social 
Welfare, Gustav Moller, proposed tripartite negotiations within a framework of much 
more direct government leadership than had characterised the tripartite talks
is. Bo Rothstein, 'Labor Market Institutions and Working Class Strength'. Paper for the 
Conference on The New Institutionalism - State, Society and Economy in Europe 
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initiated by the Conservative government in 1928. where the role of the government 
had been more passive.
LO at first welcomed the new government initiative, while SAF was reluctant. 
SAF spokesmen instead proposed bilateral talks between themselves and LO. for 
they feared dictates from the Social Democratic government. However. LO also 
experienced a potential political threat. The parliamentary situation was unstable 
and the long-term fate of the minority government was highly uncertain. A future 
Conservative-Liberal government might intervene with legislation to protect 
employers' rights in industrial conflict and to restrict the right to strike. The 
Conservatives had gone on the offensive on this question and demanded 
legislation.'9
Given an uncertain parliamentary situation, in which both parties 
experienced threats from legislation, LO agreed to SAP's proposal to hold bilateral 
talks. The government resented LO's decision, but there was nothing much it could 
do about it. Under the threat of legislation, LO and SAF negotiated for two years 
before signing the SaitsjPbaden Agreement in 1938. A new agreement in 1942 on 
rationalisation and industrial welfare confirmed the stability of the bipartite 
agreement.
The agreement at Saltsjbbaden was to become one of the most important 
elements of the Swedish model. The issue of industrial peace was finally removed 
from the political agenda, and stayed off it for the next three decades.
Given the LO-SAF agreement in 1938 on collective bargaining and industrial 
peace, and the Social Democrats' long-term hold on government power from 1936 
to 1976, the focus of the model became economic policy. This necessarily had to 
involve the government. In the tripartite institutional framework which emerged, a 
division of labour was established whereby the labour market and wage bargaining 
became the concerns of organised capital and labour, increasingly hierarchically 
organised under the peak organizations of LO and SAF. The Social Democrats




























































































established a framework for enterprises in a capitalist economy where productivity 
and profits in turn increased political distributive power. While it is a well-founded 
argument that labour organised capital, the two branches of the labour movement 
produced a model that also took the interests of employers into consideration. The 
formula that was gradually hammered out included the promotion of a high 
productivity capitalist economy, generating high profits. Although there was conflict 
between the unions and employers over the distribution of profits/wages. such 
conflict was mitigated by the protective cloak of a Social Democratic government 
which had overall responsibility for distribution and used taxes and budget transfers 
as important instruments of policy-implementation. In practice, the model contained 
tensions between class interests and broader popular interests on which 
parliamentary power could be built. However, these tensions were much less severe 
and did not provoke anything like the same loss of legitimacy as the tensions which 
existed when the Social Democrats in the Weimar Republic represented state 
interests. One sign of the lack of severity of tensions in Sweden was the fact that the 
Communist party never acquired more than 5 per cent of the votes cast in 
Parliamentary elections, except in 1944 (when it gained 10 per cent).
A distinctive feature of developments in Sweden was the compromise over 
definition of the concept of rationalisation. The compromise was not a result of direct 
government participation or the threat of legislation. It was based on a formula 
which engineered convergence between the core interests of employers and unions 
on the one hand, and a broader societal interest in industrial peace and productive 
efficiency, on the other. The power relationships underlying this triangular pattern 
gave the Swedish state-society network its specific character. By the end of the 
1930s, Sweden came very close to the ideal type of what Rolf Torstendahl has called 
participatory capitalism.
In Germany, cultural and institutional assumptions were different and set 
different preconditions for the restructuring of the 1930s. In the German union 




























































































wake of growing unemployment figures. The point of departure for the unionists' 
theory was that productivity in the 1920s had increased by leaps and bounds, with 
the implication that industrial production capacity far exceeded demand. Through 
enhanced mass consumption, the demand side would have to be strengthened so 
that labour made redundant through the rationalisation drive could again be 
integrated into the labour process. The Deutsche Metallarbeiter-Verband (DMV) in 
particular took over this argument. The 'rationalisation rage’ of the employers was 
argued to be the triggering factor. The remedy for unemployment was consequently 
seen to be shorter working hours.20
The metalworkers' strategy was based on the assumption of wage 
compensation for the reduction in working hours. The strategy led to tension in the 
union movement, because Fritz Tarnow, the economic advisor to the unions’ peak 
organization. ADGB. argued that wage compensation was an impossible goal given 
prevailing power relationships. He argued therefore, for a job-creation programme 
by means of an expansionist budgetary policy, something for which he hoped to get 
Social Democratic support in the Reichstag. According to Tarnow. the SPD had to 
act as both heir and doctor at the bedside of capitalism. The cyclical crisis had to be 
gradually combatted through a systematic job-creation policy to be implemented 
by budgetary expansion - though without giving up the goal of socialism.21
Experience of the hyper-inflation period was still fresh in the memory of the 
metalworkers who reacted negatively to Tarnow's proposal. The only outcome of 
’monetary experiments' would be a price rise which would hit unprotected workers. In 
the DMV. for a short while at the end of 1931, the unemployment question got the 
upper hand over inflation. This was due not only to the rising unemployment figures 
but also to the fact that the Communist party had become the party of the 
unemployed. However, following the DMV's new stand, in the spring of 1932 when a
20. Wolfgang Zollitsch, 'Einzelgewerkschaften und Arbeitsbeschaffung: Zum
Handlungsspielraum der Arbeiterbewegung in der Spatphase der Weimarer 
Republik' in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft No 1 1982 pp 94-97.
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united union front at last seemed possible, the SPD hesitated. Rudolf Hilferding 
opposed the ADGB's job-creation plan because it risked inflation and because it was 
'un-Marxist'.22
The dilemma of the ADGB's double 'doctor-heir strategy' (cyclical job- 
creation within the framework of the capitalist order and the introduction of 
socialism) and its lack of potential became apparent when the Papen government 
tried to adopt an expansionist strategy and began to Introduce a job-creation plan 
of its own. The unions found it impossible to support the steps taken by the 
government because the proposed tax credit notes only favoured the employers 
and also threatened some of the social achievements of the Weimar Republic.
The unions' response was to demand a consistent socialist policy’. The 
government's job-creation plan had to be eliminated from the agenda. According 
to the chairman of the DMV, support for it would cast doubt on the seriousness of the 
goal of socialism.23 His argument must be seen in the framework of the factional 
struggle with the Communists. While ADGB and SPD failed to agree on a common 
strategy, the Nazis managed to gain support for a programme involving both 
socialism and job-creation. Given the rigid structures of organised capital and the 
state bureaucracy, and given the experiences of hyperinflation, the linkage 
between rationalisation and unemployment was too strong to cut.
In both Germany and Sweden the unions placed pressure on the Social- 
Democratic parties. The difference was that in Germany the unions forced the Social 
Democratic chancellor Hermann Muller to destroy the government in 1930 when he 
failed to win the consent of the coalition parties to an agreement he had made with 
the unions whereby the fees paid by the employers for unemployment insurance 
would be raised in order to finance the increasing unemployment. After this cabinet 
crisis, rule by presidential decree was introduced. In Sweden, union pressure led the 
Social Democrats to look for a coalition partner in order to get parliamentary support
22. Ibid pp 99,103-105.




























































































for increased unemployment compensation. The 'red-green' coalition became the 
start of a period of Social-Democratic government which lasted for more than 40 
years.
The W age Policy with Solidarity
In West Germany after WW II the pressing needs of reconstruction were a 
powerful driving force in an economic context in which the role of the unions in the 
1950s was much more marginal than in Sweden. In Sweden around 1950 the unions' 
production or productivity philosophy, derived from the compromise on 
rationalisation, began to be used to develop a counter-strategy to the stabilisation 
policy of the Social Democratic government. The stabilisation policy tried to use 
wage-restraint to achieve high profits and a high level of investment in industry 
together with low inflation. The unions' 'wage policy with solidarity' meant that equal 
wages would be paid for equal work. The implication was that less profitable 
enterprises which could not pay the stipulated wages would have to close down. 
The wage level in profitable enterprises and industries was used as a benchmark in 
centralized wage negotiations. Union wage policy was a powerful instrument for 
structural change and for the transfer of labour from low to high productivity 
industries. The unions even pushed for layoffs and contraction in less competitive 
industries such as textiles, and encouraged an inter-regional and inter-industrial 
transfer of labour, especially to the engineering industry.
The compromise on the concept of rationalisation in the late 1920s, 
reconfirmed in 1938 after the temporary interruption in the early 1930s, gave a 
certain right of interpretation to employers concerning the precise measures to be 
adopted, with time studies as important instruments for change. The wage policy 
with solidarity' became an important driving force for the continued rationalisation of 
industry, for it placed low productivity enterprises under pressure. Threats of 




























































































allowances, retraining courses, labour exchange offices, etc) combined with 
selective employment incentives for stagnating regions, industries and enterprises 
(state orders, state enterprises or state subsidies of production and jobs).
When, in 1957, the Social Democrats at last accepted the model which had 
been eldborated by the LO economists Gòsta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, it also 
consented to a union claim to strengthen the Labour Market Board. Considerable 
resources were allocated to labour-market training centres. LO's strategy was not a 
strategy for dealing with unemployment, but a means to the flexible transfer of 
labour in order to promote high productivity, and to increase the wages of the 
lowest paid workers, The Labour Market Board and its retraining centres became the 
pivots ('the active labour-market policy') of this new strategy,
Role-casting in tripartite bargaining meant that through the active labour- 
market policy, the government took care of redundant workers so that after 
retraining, they could be transferred from declining to expanding industries. One 
general prerequisite was the high status of the unions, achieved not least through 
their production philosophy, Another prerequisite was the Social Democratic 
government's distribution of welfare and their political framework for freedom of 
action for capitalist enterprises.
The tripartite bargaining model of structural change was based on a 
growing economy, where minor structural problems could be taken care of by 
general growth. The Rehn-Meidner model stressed the close links between 
stabilisation policy, wage formation and labour-market policy. Labour-market policy 
was viewed as a necessary complement to general fiscal and monetary policy if the 
goals of full employment and price stability were to be realised. The 1950s and 1960s 
saw the culmination of tripartite economic management and social engineering 




























































































Strains in the Strategy
The economic logic of the wage solidarity approach was that firms were 
prevented from escaping from the consequences of poor performance in the 
product market, bad management or failure to invest in modern equipment by 
paying low wages. But the maintenance of the principle of equal pay for equal work 
also required wage restraint on the part of the employees in enterprises where the 
ability to pay was high. This restraint generated excess' profits for the employers in 
these enterprises and as there was no mechanism for transferring these gains to the 
employees in enterprises with a lower wage level they accrued to the shareholders. 
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the employees in the most profitable 
enterprises did not accept wage restraint permanently.
In 1973 Rudolf Meidner initiated a union inquiry into this problem. His point of 
departure was that the growth potential of profitable enterprises had to be 
maintained, The Meidner Report recommended that part of the excess' profits 
should be redistributed to the employees; not only to those in the profitable 
enterprises - for this would have been a veiled wage increase incompatible with 
wage policy with solidarity - but into central wage-earner funds. These ideas 
provoked massive protests from the employers who formed a committee which 
came to be called 4th October (the date of a spectacular demonstration in 
Stockholm in which tens of thousands of them rallied to fight the union proposal). In 
1983 the Social Democratic government forced a very diluted wage-earner funds bill 
through Parliament.
The strains on the wage-solidarity and active labour-market policy derived 
not only from its success in generating high profits in successful firms. The model was 
also put under pressure by the decentralising force of changes in the organisation of 
work within the private manufacturing sector. This decentralising tendency brought 
about a transition from geographical and intra-industrial mobility to local inter­
company and internal company mobility. At the level of the firm, slogans such as 




























































































strategy based on the construction of new identities whereby workers and employers 
were no longer in an employer-employee relationship, but were 'colleagues' In a joint 
venture, medarbetare. This development seems to be part of a general Western 
European trend towards an industrial relations policy based on the corporate 
culture. The problem for the unions is that old loyalties within the union movement 
based on a nation-wide and trans-sectoral class identity are supplemented and 
challenged by cross-cutting loyalties. Wage policy with solidarity breaks down 
against local management-workforce coalitions. The implications for union strategy 
of the emergence of such decentralised' and 'fragmentary' identities can hardly be 
overestimated.
This new gravitation of identity-construction towards the local, company 
level has not necessarily meant that class identity and class awareness have 
declined. Rather, it has been a matter of class identity and ties of loyalty being 
focussed on new units. Solidarity and collective ideals have not disappeared but 
their social basis seems to have shrunk to smaller sections of workers and employees. 
This is hardly a matter of a new individualism. Collective ideals and collective 
performance have not been given up but have simply changed their form and 
focus.
One important factor in this development has been deindustrialisation and 
the restructuring of key industries in manufacturing sectors such as steel and 
shipbuilding, In the struggle for survival in a declining market, local unions and 
management formed fighting forces against other corresponding constellations in 
other companies. The bounds which separated 'we' from 'they' gradually took on 
new shape.
This pattern of identity transformation has not only emerged in declining 
industries, however. Enterprises which have generated high profits in the engineering 
industry, for instance, have developed strategies to integrate core groups of workers 
as 'colleagues' in order to increase productivity when the possibilities of piece work 




























































































been a wealth of empirical evidence of this pattern over the last decade, and the 
concept of 'postfordism' has been launched to describe the development 
theoretically. Without getting into a discussion of the fruitfulness of the concept, 
'postfordism' no doubt covers an internationally observed reality of major proportions. 
In Sweden the automobile company of Volvo in particular illustrates this trend.
More generally, the 1970s saw the disappearance of the prerequisites which 
underpinned the success of the wage policy of the 1950s and 1960s. The forces of 
expansion within industry became weaker. Investment was low and enterprises were 
increasingly exposed to cost crises as international competition intensified. There was 
a tendency for labour to be attracted to the protected public sector rather than to 
the technological vanguard of manufacturing industry - which either contracted or 
had to try out new ways to enhance productivity in order to avoid contraction.
Workers’ propensity to change jobs also declined, an attitudinal change 
which lay behind growing pressure for job-protection legislation. Demands were 
made for codetermination and job protection and these were accompanied by the 
same dramatic political and ideological radicalisation which at the time was 
sweeping Western Europe as a whole. In Sweden the union movement pressed for 
changes and where they failed to secure agreement the Social Democratic 
government was used as a means to circumvent the resistance of the employers: the 
employee representation on company boards from 1973, the job protection law in 
1974 and codetermination in 1976 are just a few examples of the success of this 
strategy. This aspect of Social-Democratic labour-market policy was qualitatively 
different from the previous emphasis on distribution and the organisation of capital 
within a general regulatory framework. However, all the laws had their roots in a 
period of sustained economic growth, The heightened level of union influence was 
intended to be exerted in the distribution of an ever increasing pie and to overcome 
problems arising from the pace of change. When key industries collapsed in the 




























































































economic environment quite different from the one that had been anticipated. In 
these circumstances the legislation took on new significance.
The job protection legislation reduced workers' incentives to quit stagnating 
enterprises. Thus a central problem became how to combine the wage policy with 
solidarity (requiring transfer of labour) and the policy of employment protection - 
which was designed to ameliorate the worst effects of rapid industrial decline.
I suggest that the tendency towards job protection and local cooperation 
at the company level - where the forces encouraging mobility and centralisdtion in 
the labour market have been weakened, both on the employer and the employee 
side, (at least in manufacturing industry) - is related to the increasing use of 
subcontractors - with the emergence of a segmented labour market as a 
conceivable consequence. Such problems generated local alliances - between 
employers and strongly placed employees - which can also be regarded as 
reactions by representatives of both sides of industry and government to restrictive 
macro-economic policies. This tendency is obvious especially in the Swedish car 
industry. There, high profits, high pay. and high job security coexist with a growing 
sector of lower-paid subcontracting workers, indicating an ability of employers and 
core workers to resolve differences between themselves at the expense of workers 
forced into the secondary sector.
Other challenges to the model came from the changing structure of the 
economy brought about by the growth of services, especially the public services.
The rapid growth of the public sector should be regarded as coincidental 
with, rather than a response to. the rapid decline of key industries such as steel and 
shipbuilding. The politics of deindustrialisation had their own special logic driven by 
the emergence of mass lay-offs across broad industrial sectors, something which 
stretched the active labour market policy to its limit.24
24 See Bo Strdth, The Politics of Industrialisation. Croom Helm. London 1987 ch 4 for 




























































































Developments in Sweden from 1960 increased employment from 3.3 million 
to 4.3 million by the mid-1980s. This growth was especially dramatic in the 1970s as 
more women entered the labour market. Restructuring and decline in manufacturing 
industry caused a loss of 10.000-15.000 jobs a year in this sector but such losses were 
more than compensated for by the expansion in public sector jobs. Thus the high 
productivity enterprises in the active labour-market policy model of the union 
economists came to be replaced by the public sector as an absorber of labour. The 
public sector's role in increasing employment is reflected in its increasing share of 
GDP from 30 per cent in 1960 to 67 per cent in 1983.
The fact that this dramatic change could occur without a real loss of 
political legitimacy (an important part of the growth of the public sector occurred 
under the six years of Centre-Right governments. 1976-1982. with crisis packages to 
ailing industries) Cdn only be understood in the context of the active labour market 
policy. Unemployment in Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s never exceeded 3.5 per 
cent. After peaking at this level at the beginning of the 1980s. the figure declined to 
1.5-2 per cent. The hegemony of the active labour-market policy, in turn, is part of a 
larger political and cultural framework developed by the Social Democrats since the 
1930s. which finds its most powerful intellectual expression in the folkhemmet 
metaphor: the nation as the home of the people.
In 1965 the private sector employed more than twice as many women as 
the public sector. Between 1965 and 1983 public sector employment increased by 
264 per cent so that by the latter year, female employment in the public sector 
outstripped that in the private sector. By this time. 54 per cent of employed women 
had jobs in the public sector and by 1989 78 per cent of the employees in that sector 
were women. Thus the growth in public sector employment was largely a growth in 
the employment of women.
By 1989 only 22 per cent of the employees in the private sector (where 
wages were highest) were women. Restructuring of the economy has concentrated 




























































































there - in medical, nursery and social services - and has created gender specific 
segregations in the labour market.25 This cannot be concealed by the fact that 
equal pay for equal work apparently operates in Sweden because women are 
concentrated in low paid occupations.
This dramatic restructuring of the labour market and the labour force, of 
course meant just as dramatic a restructuring of the union membership - which in 
turn, brought new problems to the union movement. The slogan of wage policy with 
solidarity lost relevance for increasing proportions of the labour force.
It is important to emphasise that growth in the public sector and the high 
level of female participation in the labour market (80 per cent) was achieved by 
political decisions to expand the social, nursery and education services in the 1960s. 
This, in turn, must be related to the parliamentary situation. The Social Democrats 
realised at an early date that they had to build class alliances in order to gain and 
maintain parliamentary power. From the 1930s to the 1950s they built such an 
alliance with the farmers. In the late 1950s the base of this alliance had been eroded 
due to the decline of agriculture. In this situation the Social Democrats turned to the 
growing middle class of white-collar employees. The middle classes were attracted 
by qualitative changes in the Social Democrats' perception of the welfare state. The 
'minimalistic1 approach, by which the poor were guaranteed d minimum sdfety net 
of sociol security was exchanged for a 'maximalistic' strategy. Rather than a welfare 
state shaped dround the requirements of the working class it was designed to meet 
the standard of the middle classes: a higher standard of service to which the working 
class also gained access. Pensions, sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, 
and other reforms were adjusted upwards, something which made the new strategy 
very expansive.26
25. Gôsta Esping-Andersen, 'Jâmlikhet, effektivitet och makt, Socidldemokratisk 
vâlfârdspolitik' in: Kldus Misgeld, Karl Molin and Klas Âmark (eds), 






























































































This transformation brought an explosive growth of social expenditures and 
taxes in the 1960s and 1970s and a dramatic increase in the level of female 
participation in the labour market. Increasing taxes encouraged women to enter the 
labour market in order to increase real household incomes. Their labour was 
demanded and they were absorbed into the rapidly growing social-services sector 
at low levels of pay, a fact that eased somewhat the escalating costs, although it 
posed a long-term problem with explosive force.
By 1980 the centralised and hierarchical organisation of the Swedish labour 
market was exposed to severe strains from two directions: the growth of increasingly 
fragmented identities constructed around the company in the private sector and 
the restructuring of the labour force (and the union membership) leading to a long­
term growth of low-paid (female) labour in the public-services sector. In the 1980s 
these strains were to create severe problems of legitimacy for the established wage 
formation procedure (see below).
The gradual replacement of class-based nation-wide identities by loyalties 
to workmates at the company level, did not take place to a greater extent than in 
Germany: if anything, the opposite was true. However, in Germany the point of 
departure of this process was a less centralised and less hierarchical organisation of 
society. The works council order (Betriebsrdte) had always been a powerful counter­
weight to strategies of centralisation in the union movement. Another institutional 
factor working in the same direction was the federal structure of the republic and the 
role of the Land in politics and of the Bezirk in the union organisation. The wage 
formation process in West Germany had a much more regional focus than in 
Sweden. Therefore, the wage-formation process was not exposed to problems of 
legitimacy as it was in Sweden. Neither did the public sector expand as fast as in 
Sweden. Still another factor which differentiated the prerequisites of union strategies 
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Operating within Sweden's full-employment culture, the economic. 
Ideological, and political processes outlined above culminated in a major economic 
crisis in the late 1970s/early 1980s the main components of which were high inflation 
and a huge budget deficit. But. despite these strains, the goal of full employment 
was not sacrificed, and an active labour-market policy continued to be a major 
plank in the government’s approach. A shift in this policy from a concentration on 
mobility to an emphasis on job protection occurred. In the early 1980s both the 
budget and the balance of payments were in deficit. As a result, fiscal policy 
became much more restrictive and the growth in public spending was cut back. In 
official documents laying out labour market policy the emphasis shifted from job 
protection to labour-market adjustment and labour mobility in order to facilitate 
growth in the private sector. Generally, the emphasis in policy discussion changed 
from demand to supply, although there was a considerable time-lag between early 
political discussions of policy and its implementation.27
This shift in emphasis was not only a response to budget deficits, but also 
resulted from changing political attitudes as the restructuring of the economy 
increased social rivalry and as the share of wages in GNP declined. Subsidies to ailing 
industries were also increasingly called into guestion. The new policy seemed to 
receive as much public support as had the massive state interventions at the mid- 
1970s and raises questions about the long-term durability of the folkhemmet 
ideology. This is particularly so because the policy changes, influenced by the new 
mood, were implemented by the Social Democratic government after its return to 
power in 1982 and represented a qualitatively new approach rather than a reversion 
to strategies adopted prior to its defeat in 1976.
By 1990 when unemployment was down to 1.5 percent, the great political 
problem concerning the labour market was soaring inflation produced by wage
27. Bo Strath and Frank Wilkinson, The Swedish Wage Policy with Solidarity and 
Active Labour Market Policy'. Manuscript 1990. Cf EFA (Delegation for Labour 
Market Policy Research at the Swedish Ministry of Labour), Labour Market Policy 




























































































pressures on an overheated labour market, with a shortage of labour in several 
sectors. This problem, in turn, must be seen in the context of the economic and 
labour-market policies implemented since 1982.
In the programme approved by the Social Democratic party congress in
1981 the need for economic restraint in the public sector was emphasised. Public 
and private consumption was to be reduced to free resources for industrial 
investment. When the Social Democratic party returned to power in 1982 one of the 
first steps of the new government was a 16 percent devaluation of the Swedish 
krona. Between 1981 and 1983. profits increased from 22 percent to 34 percent of 
value added. Thus, the interests of industry were promoted much more than the 
party congress had envisaged in 1981.
The core of Social-Democratic economic policy in the 1980s - the policy of 
the third way' - involved persuading the unions to keep wage rises non-inflationary, 
while allowing a massive expansion to take place in the economy. As a means to the 
implementation of this policy, capital movements were liberalised. The effect was 
quick fortune-building and high profits. The deregulation of financial markets was 
followed by a stock market boom. Another consequence of the policy of the third 
woy’ was that as a proportion of GDP, public spending decreased from 68 percent in
1982 to 61 percent in 1989.
The new policy of promoting the interests of private industry was forced 
through by the upper echelons of the Social-Democratic leadership. The decisions of 
both the party congress in 1981 and of the LO congress in the same year placed 
more emphasis on macro-economic stabilisation than had similar decisions three 
decades before. Whereas, in the 1950s. the union model provided a formula which 
combined the government’s interest in stabilisation, the unions interest in wage 
increases and solidarity, and the employers' interest in production and productivity 
increases, the Social Democratic government policies in the 1980s gave much less 
weight to the unions interests in wage increases and solidarity. In terms of political 




























































































constructing a coalition necessary to win the election other interests than those of LO 
had to be taken into account. This was probably one of the lessons learnt from the 
defeat in 1976 and. moreover, the basis for this new configuration of power within 
the ranks of the Social Democrats had been laid by the policies (outlined above) 
adopted in the 1960s to attract the middle classes. Consequently, in the 1980s LO has 
been far more on the defensive than in the 1950s and union members have had to 
pay for the improved economic performance, low unemployment, sharply reduced 
budget deficits, and increased profits by reduced real wages.28
The problems increasingly faced in the 1970s - i.e. the limitations of an 
expansive fiscal policy and the difficulties in reducing unemployment without 
inflationary effects - had been forecasted by LO economists. Gosta Rehn and Rudolf 
Meidner, the architects of the wage solidarity model, were effectively supply side 
economists long before the phrase was coined. Their model not only emphasised 
selectivity over general economic stimulation but also included policies directed 
towards the supply side of the economy.
However, their scepticism about general macro-economic policies was not 
based on the neoliberal models which were elaborated in the 1970s, and which 
rested on the assumption that full employment was generated by the market so that 
government intervention was destabilising. The LO economists worked within a 
Keynesian framework but recognised the supply side barriers to economic growth. 
They realised that capital would not necessarily respond to demand side 
opportunities by adopting best-practice techniques if they could escape supply side 
disciplines by paying low wages. They also accepted that the labour market did not 
operate 'perfectly' in transferring workers from declining to expanding sectors. 
Therefore, they reasoned, the compulsion on firms to use labour efficiently required
28. Cf Klas Amark, 'Sammanhdllning och intressepolitik. Socialdemokratin och 





























































































complementary labour-market policies in order to ensure that workers so displaced 
were rapidly, and profitably, re-employed.
'Wage policy with solidarity' would certainly increase costs during a period 
of transition. However, in the long term it would reduce supply disturbances in the 
form of labour shortages - something which would put cost pressures on prices. 
Retraining courses and removal allowances were aimed at an expansionary policy 
without inflationary pressure. At the same time, retraining, supplemented later by 
adult-secondary and post-secondary school education, and labour market 
intervention for special groups, (such as redundant young people and disabled 
people), would speed up the accumulation of human capital.
In this respect the accumulation of groups with low wages in the public 
sector meant an important change in the prerequisites of the model. For the 1982 
devaluation of the krona to work properly, the non-tradable goods sector should 
have released labour into the newly competitive export sector. Instead, the public 
sector continued to be a main source of demand. With no spare labour, wage 
pressures soon emerged. However, these pressures were of a different kind than in 
the old union model. The link between the wage-formation process and the 
productivity question was cut in the 1980s. According to conventional wisdom, small 
wage differentials inhibit labour mobility. What the model had actually 
demonstrated in the 1950s and 1960s was that narrow wage differentials would 
speed up the movement from low- to high-productivity sectors by weeding out 
unprofitable firms and favouring high-productivity ones. The emerging and long-term
problem intrinsic to this successful process became visible in the 1980s when,wage
■ «6?/,
solidarity among key groups of skilled or professional labour was accused of aiming 
at general wage equalisation, compressing wage differentials not just within a job 
category but between different occupations and skills, The differential between the 
average wages of skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers narrowed from 54 percent 
in the 1960s to 25 percent in the 1980s. The emerging pattern of wage relationships 




























































































demands for more equal wages by the numerous well-educated but low-paid 
employees in the public service sector. A split arose within the institutional framework 
of bargaining where LO lost influence and as a result of increasing rivalry between 
public- and private-sector unions LO's member unions adopted the position that 
everyone must be paid above the average. The struggle over wages changed its 
focus from the relationship between labour and capital to a focus on the relational 
struggle involving demands for compensation for what other groups had acquired. 
The white-collar and public sector unions gate-crashed the centralised bipartite LO- 
SAF bargaining structure of the 1950s and 1960s. The refusal of the employees in the 
public sector to take notice of the model's key precondition, namely, the 
maintenance of industrial peace constitutes a serious challenge. This refusal has 
contributed to the partial dissolution of the model.
This development is less an economic problem than a cultural one where 
the old production of meaning has lost both legitimacy and the capacity to 
convince and where no new concepts and interpretative frameworks having a 
corresponding degree of attraction have taken root. This problem of the production 
of convincing interpretative frameworks must in turn be related to the tremendous 
restructuring of the labour force since the 1960s.
Gbsta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner did not hesitate to put the model into 
action by means of political decision-making processes, by governmental 
administration, and through the centralised organisations of labour and capital. The 
institutional framework for the implementation of such centralised policies has been 
weakened by economic restructuring. Centralised control in the employers' 
association and unions was loosened by an increasing tendency towards close 
cooperation at the company level and sectoral wage negotiations. The employers' 
new 'colleague' strategy - involving the attempt to tie core groups of employees 




























































































enterprise - meant a break with the strategy pursued since the mutual labour-market 
agreement of 1906.29
Difficulties with 'wage policy with solidarity' have in their turn considerably 
increased tensions within LO, However, they have not been powerful enough to 
prevent the successful emergence of an institutional framework for wage- 
determination, A main goal of the employers' association SAP. is to establish a 
decentralised bargaining structure. A long-term goal of SAF in 1990 is to decentralise 
pay-bargaining to company level where wages can fully reflect profits and local 
demand and supply. It is little consolation for LO that small- and medium-sized 
employers are less keen on decentralised bargaining, because they do not seem to 
be powerful enough within SAF. They, like the LO, argue that when unemployment is 
as low as 1.5 percent, completely free competition for labour would lead to leap­
frogging demands.
Perspectives
The perspective I have adopted in this paper has implied using the concept 
of strategy in a wide sense; i.e. both deliberate, intended, 'rationally-calculated and 
emergent strategies have been considered. A point of departure has been the 
awareness that historical analysis is an ex post facto reconstruction of specific 
processes which we know about afterwards.
In an analysis of this kind it is important to pay attention to the historical 
context in which actors and formations in the labour market form their goals and 
orient their actions. These are mutually contingent on power relationships and on the 
goals and actions of other actors. Strategy formation is not only a matter of the 
internal organisation and its bureaucracy but is highly dependent on the 
environment.




























































































In this perspective of historical complexity strategies that are ex post facto 
successful can be given their specific logics analytically through reconstruction - 
which is not to say that there were no other alternatives. Neither does this 
perspective mean that those who suggested or put to the test successful strategies 
necessarily realised the full potential of such strategies. Quite often, ex post facto 
successful strategies are proposed as short-term responses and reactions ignoring 
their long-term effects.
In the Swedish case the precise direction in which such try-outs were linked 
by the collective decisions and actions of employers, unions, and politicians seems to 
demonstrate that somehow the capacity to engineer convergence between the 
interests of key actors was greater than in Germany. This capacity must be referred 
to the way in which interests are produced and identities constructed in the 
discursive struggles over the formulation of problems in the organisation of society.
The 1890s and 1930s were crucial turning points at which the trajectories of 
development of the labour market in Sweden and Germany were diverted onto 
different tracks.
Once interest production brings the interests of different actors and 
formations together in a single formula for change, it is likely that a successful 
strategy will emerge. By means of hindsight, the logic and rationality of such 
strategies are explored, and institutions with their own inertia are established to 
implement them. Institutional inertia means that there is a tendency of self-fulfilment 
of the successful strategy.
However, the Swedish case does not only reveal a successful bringing 
together of separate interests and their institutionalisation, but also the fact that new 
problems may require solutions which the strategy and its institutions fail to supply. At 
such historical turning points, interest production, identity construction and 
interpretative frameworks must be tackled from new perspectives. At the same time, 
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